Seeing is believing; or is it? An emperical study of computer simulations as evidence. by Bennett, Robert B. et al.
Butler University
Digital Commons @ Butler University
Scholarship and Professional Work - Business College of Business
1999
Seeing is believing; or is it? An emperical study of
computer simulations as evidence.
Robert B. Bennett
Butler University, rbennett@butler.edu
Jordan H. Leibman
Richard Fetter
Butler University, rfetter@butler.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cob_papers
Part of the Law Commons, and the Technology and Innovation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Business at Digital Commons @ Butler University. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Scholarship and Professional Work - Business by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Butler University. For more
information, please contact fgaede@butler.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bennett, Robert B.; Leibman, Jordan H.; and Fetter, Richard, "Seeing is believing; or is it? An emperical study of computer simulations
as evidence." (1999). Scholarship and Professional Work - Business. Paper 63.
http://digitalcommons.butler.edu/cob_papers/63
SEEING IS BELIEVING; OR IS IT? AN EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF COMPUTER SIMULATIONS AS EVIDENCE 
Robert B. Bennett, Jr. !.~ 
Jordan H. Leibman** 
Richard E. Fetter :;,:;,:1, 
Relying on the old adage, "seeing is believing," we conclude 
that the jury may give undue weight to an animated reconstruc-
tion of the accident . ... It would be an inordinately difficult 
task for the plaintiff to counter, by cross-examination or other-
wise, the impression that a computerized depiction of the acci-
dent is necessarily more accurate than an oral description of 
how the accident occurred. Because the expert's conclusion 
would be graphically depicted in a moving and animated form, 
the viewing of the computer simulation might more readily lead 
the jury to accept the data and premises underlying the defen-
dant's expert's opinion . .. than it might if the jury were forced 
to evaluate the expert's opinion in the light of the testimony of 
all of the witnesses, as generally occurs in such cases.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Proponents tout the use of computer simulations and anima-
tions in trials as demonstrative evidence of a persuasive and win-
ning technique, a virtual "silver bullet" guaranteeing success be-
cause of their dramatic impact upon jurors.2 The deductive 
::~ Associate Professor of Business Law, Butler University. 
...... Professor of Business Law, Indiana University-Indianapolis . 
........ ~ Associate Professor of Marketing, Butler University. 
1. Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc., No. CIV.A.92-3404, 1994 WL 
124857, at :::5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4,1994). 
2. See, e.g., Carlo D'Angelo, The Snoop Doggy Dogg Trial: A Look at How 
Computer Animation Will Impact Litigation in the Next Century, 32 U.S.F. L. 
REV. 561, 585 (1998) ("Given its highly persuasive tendencies, computer anima-
tion is likely to become the single most powerful evidentiary tool utilized by 
trial lawyers in the next century."); Robert J. Bingle, Winning the Verdict with 
Videos and Virtual Reality, NAT'L L.J., June 15, 1998, at B7; Thomas Brown, 
Animations Add a New Dimension; Visual Evidence; Computer Animation Be-
comes a Sophisticated Evidence Tool, MICH. LAw. WKLY., May 27, 1991, at 19 
("VVhen computer-aided evidentiary tools are produced by experienced demon-
strative evidence firms, they have been shown to increase jurors' retention of 
257 
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reasoning supporting such a position is flawless. Our society is fas~ 
cinated, even obsessed, with modern technology, particularly com" 
puters which project an aura of objectivity.3 Americans are also ac" 
customed to receiving information from video sources.4 Social 
science research also supports the proposition that we assimilate 
and remember more information that we see, or see and hear, than 
what we hear alone.s It follows that the use of computer animations 
or simulations as demonstrative evidence for jurors presents an un" 
paralleled opportunity-or danger-depending on one's point of 
view. The perceived power of animations and simulations to sway 
jurors has made their admissibility extremely controversial among 
both courts6 and commentators.7 
important information and shorten the duration of trials."); Catherine DiDo-
menico, Animation Gets a Jury's Attention and Illustrates Key Points of Case, 
N.Y. L.J., Nov. 5, 1996, at 5 ("Computer animation is a flexible litigation tool 
that offers tremendous advantages over traditional charts and graphs."). 
One author noted: 
As for the future, [Computer-Generated Re-enactments ("CGR")] will 
appear more and more in courtrooms. One reason will be that CGRs 
will cost less in the future as computational power in general goes 
down in price and as more CGR designers enter the business. An-
other reason will be that more lawyers will begin to realize the power 
of CGRs to induce settlements and win trials. 
Barry Sullivan, Comment, Computer-Generated Re-Enactments as Evidence in 
Accident Cases, 3 HIGH TECH. L.J. 193, 239 (1989). Another commentator dis-
cussed the power of photo-realistic animation. He stated: 
During a trial, a photo-realistic animation is a memorable and atten-
tion-getting event. Jurors can be expected to watch and to pay much 
closer attention to a computer-generated animation than to all but the 
most dramatic of testimonial evidence. While computer animation in 
the courtroom is gaining more acceptance, few lawyers realize the po-
tential power of this tool-until they come up against it themselves. 
Derek Danois, Computer Animation Helps Win Cases; By Visualizing Complex 
Evidence, Juror Comprehension Rises, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, July 17, 1995, at 
S8. 
3. Over 41 million personal computers were sold in the United States in 
1994 and 1995 alone. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT 
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1998, at 759 (1998). It is certainly not coincidental that 
Bill Gates, the founder of the software giant Microsoft, is generally credited 
with being the world's richest man. See, e.g., Alt.Culture (visited Feb. 23, 
1999) <http://www.altculture.coml.index/aentries/g/gates_hill.html>; Pat O'Neil, 
Stockbook-Weekly Newsletter (Aug. 12, 1996) <http://stockbook.comlstockbook 
larchiveslissue201. cfm>; Technopolitics Transcripts (Blackwell Corp. radio 
broadcast transcript, July 3, 1998) <http://technopolitics.comlscripts/tp07-03-
9S.htm>. 
4. Sales of television sets accounted for almost $9 billion in the United 
States in 1996 alone. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 3, at 760. In 
1996 the average hours of television viewing per person, per year, reached a re-
cord of 1567 hours, together with a record 49 hours of home video, compared 
with an average of 161 hours reading daily newspapers, 83 hours reading 
magazines, and 99 hours reading books. See id. at 572. 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 15-16. 
6. See, e.g., Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 121-26 
(2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting); Racz v. RT. Merryman Truck-
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However, jury decision-making is a complex social task in 
which a number of strangers deliberate and decide the outcome of 
an often lengthy and confusing trial. The evidence marshalled by 
proponents to support the efficacy of computer simulations in 
swaying jury decisions is largely anecdotal. To determine whether 
the criticisms of computer simulations could be supported by em-
pirical evidence, we performed a laboratory experiment to study the 
effects of one such simulation on a series of mock, civil jury, com-
parative fault verdicts.s We will provide a brief background on 
computer animations and simulations and the controversy sur-
rounding them. Then we will describe the empirical research proj-
ect and its results. 
1. BACKGROUND 
The apocalyptic aura surrounding the year 2000 software 
problem has made it clear that computers have changed the face of 
American society. It was inevitable that their influence would ex-
tend to affect litigation.9 Computers are being used for document 
ing, Inc., No. CIV.A.92-3404, 1994 WL 124857, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994); 
Bledsoe v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 880 P.2d 689, 691-93 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1994); Pino v. Gauthier, 633 So. 2d 638, 652 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Commer-
cial Union Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 591 N.E.2d 165, 167-69 (Mass. 1992); 
Richardson v. State Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 863 S.W.2d 876,881-82 (Mo. 
1993) (en bane); Bray v. Bi-State Dev. Corp., 949 S.W.2d 93, 97-100 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1997); Kudlacek v. Fiat S.p.A., 509 N.W.2d 603, 617-18 (Neb. 1994); Def-
finbaugh v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n., 588 N.E.2d 189, 193-94 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1990); Brown v. Boise-Cascade Corp., 946 P.2d 324, 342 (Or. Ct. App. 1997); 
Steinhart v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Ins., No. 96-2656, 1997 WL 697788, at ';:4 
(Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 11,1997) (per curiam) (unpublished table decision). 
7. See, e.g., Richard C. Jennings, Evidence Survey, 72 DEN'!. U. L. REv. 
703, 715-20 (1995) (stating that video animation may have a "dramatic power" 
over the trier of fact); Adam T. Berkoff, Comment, Computer Simulations in 
Litigation: Are Television Generation Jurors Being Misled?, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 
829, 845-54 (1994) (suggesting the possible abuses, misunderstandings, and 
disadvantages to using computer simulations); Sullivan, supra note 2, at 239 
("[Computer-Generated Re-enactmentsl constitute an interesting form of evi-
dence. Numerous adjectives could apply to them: educational, informative, in-
novative, dangerous, misleading, and prejudicial. Such a disparate nature 
counsels caution for courts determining the admissibility of a CGR."); Declan 
O'Flaherty, Computer-Generated Displays in the Courtroom: For Better or 
Worse?, 4 WEB J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES 1, § 3 (Sept. 30, 1996) <http://webjcli. 
ncl.ac.ukl1996/issue4loflah4.html> (discussing the potential misuse of computer 
generated displays). 
8. For background on development of the empirical research project, see 
Robert B. Bennett, Jr. et al., The Empirical Legal Research Initiative: An In-
terimReport to the Academy, 14J. LEGAL STUD. Enuc. 237 (1996). 
9. See, e.g., Frederic 1. Lederer, Technology Comes to the Courtroom, 
and ... , 43 EMORY L.J. 1095 (1994) (discussing computer-based technology and 
how it might be used in the courtroom); Evelyn D. Kousoubris, Comment, Com-
puter Animation: Creativity in the Courtroom, 14 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 
257 (1995) (examjnjng computer animation and its future role in modern litiga-
tion). 
HeinOnline -- 34 Wake Forest L. Rev. 259 1999 
260 WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34 
production and management,10 and increasingly to produce evidence 
to be shown to the jury in the form of computer "animations" and 
"simulations."n Although there may not be a bright line distinction 
between the two, the term "computer animations" generally refers 
to artistic renderings or images, which the program alters to give 
the effect of movement/2 whereas "computer simulations" generally 
involve the input, calculation, and manipulation of rules of physics, 
such as the effects of acceleration, gravity, friction, atmospheric 
pressure, water flow, etc.1S In other words, the emphasis in 
"computer animations" is illustration, while "computer simulations" 
involve both computation and illustration.14 
Computer animations and simulations seem to offer a persua-
sive tool for the litigator in educating or indoctrinating a jury. So-
cial science research shows that people tend to assimilate and re-
member more information that they see, or see and hear, than they 
hear alone. For example, one study found that after three hours, 
subjects retained 70% of information they were told, 72% of infor-
mation they were shown, and 85% of information that they were 
told and shown.I5 The disparities became more marked after sev-
enty-two hours; subjects retained 10% of the material that they 
were told, 20% of the material that they were shown, and 65% of the 
material that they were told and shown. 16 Jurors are also accus-
tomed to information presented in a video format.17 
10. See generally Mario Borelli, Note, The Computer As Advocate: An Ap-
proach to Computer-Generated Displays in the Courtroom, 71 IND. L.J. 439 
(1996) (examining computer displays as both evidence and arguments). 
11. See id. at 451. 
12. See Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 808 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). 
13. See Borelli, supra note 10, at 450-52. 
14. See Pierce, 718 So. 2d at 809; Berkoff, supra note 7, at 830-31; Borelli, 
supra note 10, at 450-52. 
15. See Berkoff, supra note 7, at 845. 
16. See id.; see also Borelli, supra note 10, at 453 (citing similar statistics); 
Jane A. Kalinski, Note, Jurors at the Movies, Day-in-the-Life Videos As Effective 
Evidentiary Tool or Unfairly Prejudicial Device?, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 789, 
792-93 (1993) (same); Bingle, supra note 2, at B7 (same). 
17. See supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also Berkoff, supra note 7, 
at 829-30 (discussing the effects of computer generated simulations on jurors). 
Several commentators have discussed the advantages of presenting infor-
mation in video format. Fred Cate and Newton Minow found: 
New technologies offer hope as well. Computers and interactive 
video, by appealing to jurors visually, can stimulate their interest, 
improve their understanding, and increase their ability to retain and 
recall evidence that has been presented during trial. Complex facts 
and points of law can be explained more clearly and effectively . . . . 
These technological innovations, while raising their own important 
issues, bode well for increasing the clarity of courtroom communica-
tions. 
Fred H. Cate & Newton N. Minow, Communicating with Juries, 68 IND. L.J. 
1101, 1118 (1993). Other authors have noted: 
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Computer animations and simulations offer advantages over 
other media, allowing the presentation of a scene from varied per-
spectives so that the audience can see objects or events from differ-
ent vantage points. IS The events can be shown in slow and fast mo-
tion or using stop action to focus on or highlight elements of a 
scene.I9 The presenter may also modify parameters or assumptions 
for analysis/o and motions can be changed to illustrate interactions 
in a complex relationship. The presenters can eliminate extraneous 
background or details that may be unrelated to what happened.21 
These advantages have made computer animations and simula-
tions both attractive and controversial. Litigants believe computer-
generated displays will bolster their arguments, making them 
memorable and convincing to jurors. They are persuaded that com~ 
puter-generated displays are as effective as demonstrative evi-
Our society is in the electronic age, and has been for several decades. 
Perhaps the most useful electronic tool available to the trial lawyer is 
the videotape machine . . . . The videotape is itself far superior to 
reading a sterile transcript of a sworn statement when the witness 
cannot or will not appear at trial. 
Thomas A. Heffernan, Effective Use of Demonstrative Evidence-"Seeing is Be-
lieving", 10 Mi. J. TRIALADvoc. 109, 112 (1987). Author Jane Kalinski notes: 
Additionally, jurors are extremely familiar with the method of pres en-
tation of a day-in-the-life video. "The average juror possesses a highly-
developed cinematic sensibility, albeit unconscious, which derives 
from years, usually decades, of movie-going and television-watching." 
The early use of television as a source of entertainment naturally se-
gued into the widespread use of television as a means of conveying in-
formation. Jurors are accustomed to receiving much of their informa-
tion from television. Moreover, television increases juror interest and 
understanding by presenting information in a more engaging fashion 
than oral testimony. Because they trust and understand television as 
a medium, jurors also perceive day-in-the-life videos as a particularly 
credible evidentiary tool. 
Kalinski, supra note 16, at 798-99 (footnote and citation ommitted). Others 
have expressed their agreement by stating that: 
[a]s a visual aid, the micro-computer can be influential in litigation 
because people generally appreciate and remember pictures better 
than they do words. With a computer simulation model, the trial 
lawyer can present events dynamically to ensure that the jury and the 
court will perceive them in the way an expert has described them 
. . .. In this age of television, the impact on the jury of a computer 
simulation on a television-like monitor cannot be overlooked. Com-
puter simulations, like television, effectively package a point of view 
through a dynamic, visual presentation. 
C. Caverhill Schaefer et al., Computer Simulations in Court, TRIAL, July 1987, 
at 69, 69-70. 
18. See Schaefer et al., supra note 17, at 72. 
19. See id. 
20. See id.; Berkoff, supra note 7, at 849. 
21. See Schaefer et al., supra note 17, at 72-73; David Weinberg, "Seeing Is 
Believing" When You Uses [sic] Scientific Animation, MICH. L. WKLY., Dec. 6, 
1993, at 5B. 
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dence.22 In fact, courts are beginning to struggle with issues raised 
by dueling simulations.23 Critics24 and COurtS25 are concerned that 
22. For a discussion of proponents' claims regarding computer simulations 
as a winning technique, see supra note 2 and accompanying text. See also 
Berkoff, supra note 7, at 836 ("[Computer simulations] were originally viewed 
with trepidation, but are now seen as benign tools. This view may be a bit too 
trusting."). 
23. See, e.g., People v. Hood, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 137, 139 (Ct. App. 1997) 
(admitting as evidence computer simulations introduced by both the prosecu-
tion and the defense); John Butler, Tell Your Story to the Jury Through Com-
puter Animations, MICH. LAw. WKLY., Mar. 13, 1995, at 3 (discussing a case in 
which the judge admitted animation for demonstrative purposes). 
24. For example one commentator states: 
A highly persuasive computer animated exhibit certainly could con-
fuse or mislead a jury. After all, the powerful demonstrative images 
portrayed in a computer animated piece might influence jurors to be-
lieve that those images are an actual account of the event and not 
merely one party's interpretation of the facts. A trial judge's caution-
ary instructions may not be sufficient to offset jurors' tendency to be-
lieve what they see, even when it is contradicted by the real evidence 
offered at trial. 
D'Angelo, supra note 2, at 570. Sullivan agrees with these concerns. 
Furthermore, a good [Computer-Generated Re-enactment] can re-
enact an accident with an almost eerie reality. However wrong that 
reality may be, the danger exists that a jury will accept it unques-
tioningly. The reasons for this danger stem from the high quality of a 
CGR's images, the fact that a computer generated a R's [Re-
enactment] images, and the fact the CGR appeared on a "TV." This 
problem would seem to loom particularly large when the opposition 
does not offer their own CGR in rebuttal. 
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 195. 
25. See, e.g., Hinkle v. City of Clarksburg, 81 F.3d 416, 424-25 (4th Cir. 
1996) (recognizing "the unique problems presented by the introduction of video-
tapes purporting to recreate events at the focus of a trial" but "fail[ing] to see a 
practical distinction . . . between a real-life recreation and one generated 
through computer animation" and stating that "both can be a particularly pow-
erful recreation of the events"); Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 
111, 121-26 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) ("As courts are 
drawn willy-nilly into the magic world of computerization, it is of utmost impor-
tance that appropriate standards be set for the introduction of computerized 
evidence."); Van Houten-Maynard v. ANR Pipeline Co., No. 89C0377, 1995 WL 
317056, at *12 (N.D. m. May 23, 1995) (noting that "this type of evidence can 
be highly influential upon a jury, well beyond its reliability and materiality," 
and that "computer animation evidence ... may well have an undue detrimen-
tal effect on other more reliable and trustworthy direct-type evidence"); Bledsoe 
v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 880 P.2d 689, 691-93 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1994) (setting minimum foundational requirements for computer simulations); 
Pino v. Gauthier, 633 So. 2d 638, 652 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (affirming the trial 
court's rejection of computer simulations as unduly prejudicial, and holding 
that "[t]he factors favoring admission are substantially outweighed by the fac-
tors against admission .... It was proper to avoid the impact of the jury viewing 
the specially created tape, containing only favorable outcomes"); Sommervold v. 
GrevIos, 518 N.W.2d 733,737 (S.D. 1994) ("The impact of video reenactment is 
substantial. When people see something on television, they think it is real 
even when it is not."). 
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jurors give them undue weight, that the assumptions underlying 
the displays are not readily apparent to jurors, and that the televi-
sion generation is particularly susceptible to being misled. In light 
of these concerns, courts have been struggling to develop and refine 
standards for the admissibility of simulations.26 Although it may be 
premature to say that a consensus has developed, particularly since 
trial courts are generally given wide discretion in this area,27 courts 
seem to be drawing a line between computer animations and com-
puter simulations,28 taking a more permissive stance to admission of 
the former.29 With respect to computer simulations, courts seem to 
be imposing the more rigorous standards for admissibility of scien-
tific evidence mandated by Frye v. United StateiO or Daubert v. 
26. A comprehensive discussion of admissibility of computer simulations is 
beyond the scope of this paper. For such a discussion, see, for example, Jen-
nings, supra note 7, at 715-20, Berkoff, supra note 7, at 833-45, Borelli, supra 
note 10, at 440-49, Elaine M. Chaney, Note, Computer Simulations: How They 
Can Be Used at Trial and the Arguments for Admissibility, 19 IND. L. REV. 735, 
741-56 (1986), Sullivan, supra note 2, at 201-39, and Brien J. Wholey, Admissi-
bility of Computer Simulation Evidence in New York Courts, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 15, 
1991, at 1. 
27. See, e.g., Hinkle, 81 F.3d at 424-25 (4th Cir. 1996); Strock v. Southern 
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., No. 92-2357, 1993 WL 279069, at :;'1 (4th Cir. July 
12, 1993) (per curiam). 
28. See, e.g., Robinson v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 16 F.3d 1083, 1087 (10th 
Cir. 1994); Hood, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139-40; Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806, 
808-10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Constans v. Choctaw Transp., Inc., 712 So. 2d 
885, 900-01 (La. Ct. App. 1997); Steinhart v. St. Paul Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 
96-2656, 1997 WL 697788, at :;:4 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 11, 1997) (per curiam) 
(unpublished table decision). 
29. See, e.g., Robinson, 16 F.3d at 1087-88; Hood, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 139-
40; Pierce, 718 So. 2d at 808-09; Ladeburg v. Ray, 508 N.W.2d 694, 696 (Iowa 
1993); Constans, 712 So. 2d at 900-01; Steinhart, 1997 WL 697788, at :;:4. 
At least one commentator questions different standards for animations 
and simulations. See 1. Neel ChatteIjee, Admitting Computer Animations: More 
Caution and New Approach Are Needed, 62 DEF. COUNS. J. 36 (1995). 
30. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Frye mandates that expert testimony 
must be deduced from scientific principles that "must be sufficiently estab-
lished to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs." ld. at 1014; see also Starr v. Campos, 655 P.2d 794, 797 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1982) (applying the Frye standard to admissibility of computer simulations); 
Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Boston Edison Co., 591 N.E.2d 165, 168 (Mass. 
1992) (same). The Massachusetts Supreme Court stated: 
[W]e treat computer-generated models or simulations like other scien-
tific tests, and condition admissibility on a sufficient showing that: (1) 
the computer is functioning properly; (2) the input and underlying 
equations are sufficiently complete and accurate (and disclosed to the 
opposing party, so that they may challenge them); and (3) the pro-
gram is generally accepted by the appropriate community of scien-
tists. 
ld.; see also Bray v. Bi-State Dev. Co., 949 S.W.2d 93, 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) 
(citing Commercial Union with approval); Kudlacek v. Fiat S.p.A., 509 N.W.2d 
603, 617 (Neb. 1994) (same). 
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Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,31 their progeny,32 or alternative 
standards designed to shield jurors from undue influence.33 
The assumption underlying the position of commentators and 
courts, regardless of their position on the merits of computer anima-
tions or computer simulations, is that the use of computer-
generated displays affects jury decision-making.34 These assump-
tions ignore the reality that computer simulations are often brief 
pieces of evidence that are directed at critical issues, but often as 
31. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
32. Several cases apply the Daubert standard to admissibility of computer 
simulations. See, e.g., Robinson, 16 F.3d at 1088·89; Livingston v. Isuzu Mo-
tors, Ltd., 910 F. Supp. 1473, 1495 (D. Mont. 1995). See generally G. Michael 
Fenner, The Daubert Handbook: The Case, Its Essential Dilemma, and Its Prog-
eny, 29 CREIGHTONL. REV. 939 (1996) (providing a comprehensive list of federal 
cases following Daubert). 
33. See, e.g., Bledsoe v. Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n, 880 P.2d 689, 
692 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (requiring the proponent of computer simulation evi-
dence to satisfy the "foundational requirements for other demonstrative evi-
dence"); Richardson v. State Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 863 S.W.2d 876, 882 
(Mo. 1993) (en bane) (affirming the trial court's rejection of computer simula-
tion, and holding that it was a proper exercise of the court's discretion, since 
the simulation was not timely shown to the other side and was based on 
"variables" which the opposing party was unable to test by cross-examination). 
The Richardson court stated: 
The Commission poses the issue as a landmark test on the admissi-
bility of computer simulations as evidence in Missouri. In fact, the 
rules are clear on the admissibility of experimental evidence. Ex· 
perimental evidence is admissible only if the experiment is made un-
der substantially similar conditions to those at the time of the acci-
dent, although the conditions need not be identical. 
ld.; see also Deffinbaugh v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n, 588 N.E.2d 189, 193 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1990) Cholding that admissibility is within the discretion of the trial 
judge upon a determination that the evidence is relevant and will assist the 
trier of fact to understand the issues); Sommervold v. Grevlos, 518 N.W.2d 733, 
738 (S.D. 1994). The Sommeruold court explained: 
SDCL 19-17-1(9) requires the proponent of computer generated evi-
dence to describe the system and show that the program produced an 
accurate result. Then the animation must be relevant, probative and 
nearly identical. The animation must fairly and accurately reflect the 
oral testimony of the witness and be an aid to the jury in under-
standing the issues. 
ld. (citations omitted). 
34. See, e.g., Robinson, 16 F.3d at 1088 ("Video animation adds a new and 
powerful evidentiary tool to the trial scene .... Because of its dramatic power, 
trial judges should carefully and meticulously examine proposed animation 
evidence for proper foundation, relevancy and the potential for undue preju~ 
dice."); Racz v. R.T. Merryman Trucking, Inc., No. CIV.A.92-3404, 1994 WL 
124857, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 4, 1994) ("Relying upon the old adage, 'seeing is 
believing,' we conclude that the jury may give undue weight to an animated re-
construction of the accident."). 
Commentators are even more dogmatic. See, e.g., Berkoff, supra note 7, at 
845 ("Whether or not one sees such an impact as beneficial or detrimental to 
the judicial process, one cannot argue that computer simulations do leave a 
substantial imprint on the minds of jurors."). 
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only a small part of a lengthy and complex tria1.35 However, the 
evidence marshalled by proponents to support the efficacy of com-
puter simulations in swaying jury decisions is based on deductive 
reasoning, largely anecdotal,36 and even redundant.37 The effect of 
computer simulations or animations on jury decision-making has 
not been empirically tested. The authors have attempted to develop 
such an empirical test. 
35. In Pierce v. State, 718 So. 2d 806 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997), for example, 
the court noted that the computer animation at issue constituted approximately 
sLx minutes of an eleven-day trial. ld. at 810. Alan Gahtan reports that "a 
typical animation is about 10-15 seconds in length." Alan Gahtan, Computer 
Technology Invades Litigation Practice (Nov. 6, 1995) <http://www.gahtan.com/ 
alanlarticles/ctechlit.htm>; see also Marie G. Wilson et aI., Information Compe-
tition and Vividness Effects in On-Line Judgements, 44 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 
& HUl\I. DECISION PROCESSES 132, 138 (1989) ("[R]eal world information-
processing settings often are considerably more 'noisy' than psychological ex-
periments."). 
36. See, e.g., Berkoff, supra note 7, at 845-49 (citing the use of computer 
animations in a gas explosion case, a Delta Airline crash case, and a negligence 
case, and concluding: "[t]hese cases demonstrate that computer simulations are 
e:l>.u-emely powerful tools, which weigh heavily in the decision processes of a 
jury"); Danois, supra note 2, at S8 (citing the use of a simulation in a high pro-
file Florida hit-and-run case); Weinberg, supra note 21, at 5B (citing successful 
use of computer animation in two intellectual property cases); O'Flaherty, su-
pra note 7, § 5 (citing the use of computer animation in a gas explosion case, a 
Florida personal injury case, and a criminal case, and concluding: "[aJ brief look 
at a number of the cases in which computer-generated displays were utilized 
demonstrates the powerful and persuasive effect the technology can have on 
those who view it"). 
For a discussion of the danger of relying on anecdotal evidence, see David 
A. Hyman, Lies, Damned Lies and Narrative, 73 IND. L.J. 797, 835 (1998), who 
states "Unfortunately, 'even writers who are not ideologically motivated don't 
let the complexities of actual events stand in the way of a good story' -and 
those who are ideologically motivated are considerably less scrupulous .... In 
short, as noted previously, '[t]he plural of anecdote is not data.'" 
37. Compare Berkoff, supra note 7, at 846-47, with O'Flaherty, supra note 
7, § 5 (both citing as an example the same gas explosion case); compare David J. 
Richter, 3D Animation: Almost As Good As an Eyewitness, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 28, 
1996, at S3, with Mary Wisniewski Holden, Computer Animation Helps Law-
yers Draw Lines in Court, CHICAGO LAW., Nov. 1996, at 61 (both citing as an ex-
ample the same architect malpractice case). 
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II. THE EFFECT OF AN ANIMATED COMPUTER SIMULATION ON 
VERDICTS: AN EMPIRICAL LABORATORY EXPERIMENT38 
A. Overview 
The authors concluded that field research into the effects of 
computer simulations and animations was not feasible. Actual 
cases differ too much on their facts, on the quality of physical evi-
dence, on the personalities and abilities of attorneys, and on the ap-
peal and credibility of witnesses. On the other hand, the question 
appeared testable using laboratory methods of social psychology.39 
38. The authors gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of the 
following in carrying out this empirical investigation: 
FuNDING SUPPORT: The Academy of Legal Studies in Business (ALSB); the 
J.I. Holcomb Res. Inst.; the Ind. U. Purdue U. in Indianapolis (IUPUI) Res. 
Fellowship Program; and the AMOCO Found. Multidisciplinary Res. Grant 
Program. We especially wish to acknowledge the initiative of Professor O. Lee 
Reed, who, as ALSB President, proposed the award of a seed money grant for 
empirical research, without which this project could not have commenced. 
VOLUNTEER ACTORS AND DIRECTORS FOR THE TRIAL SIMULATIONS: Michael 
Maitzen, Mary Chappell, Joan Leibman, Christopher Dull, and Thomas Wein-
land; Professors Robert Hall, Charles Luckenbill, Richard Magjuka, Roger 
Schmenner, and Jerrold Stern. 
ALSB FACULTY ME~mERS WHO ADMINISTERED ITERATIONS OF THE TRIAL 
SIMULATIONS IN WInCH THEm STUDENTS PARTICIPATED AS MOCK JURORS: Professors 
Caryn Beck-Dudley, Utah St. U.; Robert B. Bennett, Jr., Butler U.; Don Boren, 
Bowling Green U.; Jay Erstling, U. of St. Thomas; Laura Ginger, Ind. U. 
(Bloomington); Jordan Leibman, Ind. U. (Indianapolis); Nim Razook, U. of 
Okla.; Eric Richards, Ind. U. (Bloomington); Ellen Rubert, College of Lake 
County; Robert Van Der Velde, Auburn U. (Montgomery); Nancy Wainwright, 
Eastern Wash. U.; Dexter R. Woods; Jr., Ohio Northern U.; and Floyd Wood-
ward, Ind. U. (Indianapolis). 
39. The empirical work that has been done on jury decision-making is con-
centrated in the social science literature. For three surveys of this literature, 
its contributions, and limitations, see Kathleen Carrese Gerbasi et al., Justice 
Needs a New Blindfold: A Review of Mock Jury Research, 84 PSYCHOL. BULL. 
323 (1977), Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Juror Decision-Making Models: 
The Generalization Gap; 89 PSYCHOL. BULL. 246 (1981), and Nancy Pennington 
& Reid Hastie, Practical Implications of Psychological Research on Juror and 
Jury Decision Making, 16 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 90 (1990) 
[hereinafter Pennington & Hastie, Practical Implications]. 
Others have also addressed the topic of jury decision-making. See; e.g., 
REID HAsTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY (1983); Franklin J. Boster et al., An Infor-
mation-Processing Model of Jury Decision Making, 18 COMM. RES. 524 (1991). 
Most of this work has focused on the criminal jury process. See; e.g., Mark Co-
stanzo & Sally Costanzo, Jury Decision Making in the Capital Penalty Phase; 16 
LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 185 (1992); Richard L. Wiener et al., Comprehensibility of 
Approved Jury Instructions in Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 
455 (1995). 
Much of the empirical work published to date studies the effects of per-
sonal attributes of jurors, race, and socio-economic background, or deliberation 
style on jury decisions. See, e.g., Jeffery R. Boyll, Psychological, Cognitive, Per-
sonality and Interpersonal Factors in Jury Verdicts, 151Aw & PSYCH. REV. 163 
(1991); Jane Goodman et aI., Money, Sex; and Death: Gender Bias in Wrongful 
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The authors scripted, produced, and videotaped two versions of 
a simulated, personal injury trial40 conducted under pure compara-
tive fault rules.41 In the Baseline ("Base") version, the plaintiffs ex-
pert witness presents a critical piece of evidence to the jury using an 
animated computer simulation; in the Variant version, the same 
expert presents his conclusions using only oral testimony and tradi-
tional graphics.42 
We recruited groups of mock juror subjects to view each of the 
versions. After viewing the trial tape and receiving instructions, 
the groups were randomly assigned to six- or seven-person juries. 
The juries retired to separate rooms and deliberated for up to two 
hours, rendering verdicts on forms calling for answers to special in-
terrogatories. The first interrogatory asked for the total amount of 
damages without regard to any contributory negligence. The second 
interrogatory asked the percentage of negligence attributable to 
each of three parties, two defendants and the plaintiff. The third 
interrogatory asked the amount of damages attributable to each 
party, to be calculated, by the jury, by multiplying each party's per-
centage of fault by the total amount of damages suffered by the 
Death Damage Awards, 25 LAw & SOCY REv. 263 (1991). Relatively few works, 
however, consider the effects of differences in legal rules onjury decisions. But 
see Irwin A. Horowitz, Jury Nullification: The Impact of Judicial Instructions, 
Arguments, and Challenges on Jury Decision Making, 12 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 
439 (1988) (presenting a study discussing the effects of legal rules on jury deci-
sions); Ronald J. Matlon et al., Factors Affecting Jury Decision-Making, 12 SOC. 
ACTION & L. 41, 41 (1985) ("It is somewhat surprising that relatively little em-
pirical research has been devoted to comparing the impact of extralegal factors 
to the various essential content-oriented Oegal) aspects of the trial itself on the 
decisions of the juries."). See generally Darryl K Brown, Plain Meaning, Prac-
tical Reason and Culpability: Toward a Theory of Jury Interpretation of Crimi-
nal Statutes, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1199 (1998) (discussing how juries apply crimi-
nal statutes); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury Discrimination: 
Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63 
(1993) (discussing the effect of jury discrimination on jury decisions); Barbara 
F. Reskin & Christy A. Visher, The Impacts of Evidence and Extralegal Factors 
in Jurors'Decisions, 20 L. & SOCY REv. 423 (1986) (finding that extra legal fac-
tors influenced jurors most in cases in which the state presented little hard evi-
dence). 
40. The transcripts of the two simulation versions of McKey v. Torino Pizza 
Co., including instructions, verdict forms, and exhibits are on file with the 
authors at their institutional addresses. 
41. The law in Indiana actually provides for a version of modified compara-
tive fault. For a complete description of Indiana's law and the implications for 
juries and tort reform, see Jordan H. Leibman et al., Blindfolding Comparative 
Fault Juries on the Percentage of Negligence: Should Indiana Follow the Lead of 
Illinois? 41 RES GESTAE 24 (1998). For a discussion on the alternatives to com-
parative fault, see Jordan H. Leibman et al., The Effect of Lifting the Blindfold 
From Civil Juries Charged with Apportioning Damages in Modified Compara-
tive Fault Cases: An Empirical Study of the Alternatives, 35 AM. Bus. L.J. 349 
(1998). 
42. For a more complete description of the Base and Variant differences, 
see infra Part II.B.5.a-b. 
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plaintiff. The sum of the percentages of fault for the three parties 
had to equal 100%. 
Following each jury's deliberations, each juror completed an 
exit survey which included statements to which the individual ju-
rors indicated levels of agreement on a five-point scale ranging from 
strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5). The survey asked an ad-
ditional seven demographic questions and several open-ended ques-
tions about factors influencing the juror's personal decision and that 
of his or her jury panel. 
The verdict data from the Base and Variant juries was tabu-
lated and analyzed. Descriptive statistics (means, medians, and 
standard deviations) were calculated and the two versions com-
pared. The statistical tests were performed to determine whether 
the differences between the Base and Variant measures of central 
tendency were significant. 
B. The Simulated Trial Scenario 
To ensure realism, we sought testimony and physical evidence 
from an actual trial.43 We sought a comparative fault case that 
turned primarily on issues of fact rather than law (which lawyers 
and lay persons would likely agree was typical); one in which credi-
ble evidence could be adduced at trial upon which reasonable jurors 
could differ regarding the relative fault of the parties; and one in 
which there were multiple defendants so the option of shifting fault 
among the defendants by the jury could be studied. After a lengthy 
search, we discovered an Indiana motor vehicle accident case that 
met all of these requirements.44 In discussing the case, the Indiana 
Court of Appeals said: "Nearly every fact related to the accident is 
vigorously disputed." Moreover, the plaintiffs attorney was con-
vinced from post-trial jury interviews that the computer simulations 
were a determinative piece of evidence in the case. We captioned 
the simulation produced from the underlying trial: McKey v. Torino 
Pizza Co. 
The simulation describes events that occurred at 7:00 A.M. on 
an early November day in rural southern Indiana. Dawn McKey, 
an attractive and popular sixteen-year-old cheerleader on her way 
to school, pulled out from County Road 1040 onto the preferred 
State Road 38 ("S.R. 38"), and collided with a truck called a 
43. An actual case would also provide a real-world benchmark verdict with 
which the experimental verdicts could be compared. 
44. In exchange for the use of the physical evidence in possession of the 
plaintiffs attorney, including the computer simulations that are the subject of 
this Article, we agreed to protect the privacy of the parties by withholding all 
names, the exact locations of the relevant incidents, and the name of the case. 
In this Article, we refer to the actual case upon which the simulation was based 
as the "underlying case," and have changed all names to preserve the confiden-
tiality of the participants. 
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"stepvan," driven by an employee of Torino Pizza Co. ("Torino"). 
Torino is described as "a large national manufacturer of food prod-
ucts." Dawn suffered massive brain injuries in the collision, which 
left her with no memory of the accident and virtually no subsequent 
ability to remember events from day to day. The only other accident 
witness was Torino's truck driver, Will Drummond, who incurred 
superficial injuries that were not at issue in the case.45 
The intersection is located in a valley between two low hills. 
Because the hills' sightlines in both directions were restricted for 
Dawn, the left turn across traffic onto S.R. 38 was dangerous. The 
State of Indiana had placed a 40 M.P.H. "advisory-speed" sign below 
the crest of the hill on S.R. 38, over which Will Drummond had just 
driven.46 However, the speed limit along S.R. 38 was 55 M.P.H. 
throughout the area. The parties disputed the speed of the stepvan 
at the moment of collision, and whether conditions existed requiring 
the stepvan to slow down to 40 M.P.H. The plaintiff claimed Torino, 
through its driver, was negligent because the driver had approached 
the intersection at an unreasonable speed; he had failed to abide by 
warning signs; he was unable to control his vehicle to avoid the ac-
cident; and he had failed to maintain a proper lookout. 
The plaintiff also sued the State of Indiana on the theory that it 
was well known that the intersection was highly dangerous, creat-
ing a duty for the State to do more than it had done to protect driv-
ers attempting to make left turns onto S.R. 38. Although the reason 
is not disclosed to the jury, the State did not appear at trial, because 
the plaintiff and the State had entered into a "covenant not to exe-
cute.,,47 Despite hearing no defense from it, the jury was permitted 
45. These facts and those in the following paragraphs are essentially the 
same in the underlying case. 
46. Advisory speed signs in Indiana are treated like other warning signs 
such as "yield," or "deer crossing." The statute requires drivers to take action 
in adherence to these warnings only when conditions indicate there is reason to 
do so. 
47. In the underlying case, there was virtually no possibility for the plain-
tiff to recover damages from the State. Indiana law, at the time, provided that 
the Comparative Fault Act "does not apply. . . to tort claims against govern-
mental entities." INn CODE § 34-4-33-8 (1986) (repealed 1998). With respect to 
the State, under section 34-4-33-8, contributory negligence was a complete de-
fense. Id. Under the facts of McKey, some negligence on Dawn's part was con-
ceded by the plaintiff. Presumably, the State was named as a party defendant 
to attract a portion of the fault that might otherwise be attributed to Dawn. 
Because Indiana is a modified comparative fault State, with 51% creating a bar 
to recovery, it was important for the plaintiff to make it as easy as possible for 
the jury to assign at least 50% to the defendants. The defense was probably 
ambivalent about this strategy because it could not be confident that Dawn 
would be found more than 50% responsible for her own injuries. The defense, 
therefore, may have welcomed the opportunity to lay-off part of the fault on an-
other defendant. In any event, the jury knew none of this and had to assume 
the State would pay its share of any damages assessed against it. 
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to allocate a percentage of fault to the State. The trial simulation 
breaks down into the following fourteen segments. 
1. Plaintiffs opening statement 
The plaintiffs attorney tells the jury about Dawn, her family, 
her aspirations, her injuries, her suffering, and what she has lost as 
a result of the accident. He describes the plaintiffs theory of the 
case and gives reasons why the jury should allocate fault to the de-
fendants. He treats the state's liability lightly, and he raises the 
dangerousness of the intersection primarily to show that Torino's 
agent, Will Drummond, had notice of it and failed to take it into ac-
count. 
2. Defendant's opening statement 
Torino's attorney pleads for the jury not to let sympathy for 
Dawn affect its consideration of the liability issues. He also asks 
them to accept that Will Drummond had no reason to go on high 
alert at the intersection, that his driving behavior was reasonable, 
and that his speed approaching Dawn's car could not really be as-
certained, even by Will. As a result, he asks the jurors to attribute 
100% of the fault to Dawn and the State. 
3. Testimony of Carter Stumpf 
The Lincoln County Sheriffs Captain, Carter Stumpf, is shown 
photographs of the road and the 40 M.P.H. advisory sign and testi-
fies to the well-known dangerousness of the intersection. Stumpf is 
shown color photographs of the wreckage with which he describes 
the scene at the site shortly after the accident. The photographs re-
veal no skid marks. His accident report describes dry pavement, 
daylight, and Dawn's failure to yield the right of way. 
4. Testimony of Will Drummond 
Torino's truck driver, Will Drummond, testifies about his expe-
rience driving grain trucks, the nature of his job as a delivery/route 
salesman for Torino, his suspension for tardy paper work, and his 
return to work the day of the accident. He asserts that Dawn's pull-
out that day left him no opportunity to take evasive action. Drum-
mond testifies that he doesn't remember seeing the 40 M.P.H. advi-
sory and school bus signs. Further, he concedes that he was doing 
55 M.P.H. to the crest of the hill and believes he had "eased off' the 
accelerator on the way down, but he can not remember his approach 
speed. He testifies that Dawn stopped at the stop sign located 
twenty-six feet from S.R. 38, then pulled out without stopping again 
from that position. Drummond maintains that he did brake before 
the collision. 
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5. Testimony of Vincent Schneider 
The plaintiffs expert accident reconstructionist/s Vincent 
Schneider, describes his qualifications, his methods for recon-
structing pre-accident rates of speed,49 and his assumptions re-
garding the initial positions of the parties.50 He testifies that the 
48. One commentator describes the task of the accident reconstructionist 
as follows: 
Although no two accidents are perfectly identical, an expert accident 
reconstructionist attempts to determine the following details common 
to every accident: i) the physical factors involved in the accident; ii) 
the physical factors involved in the production of injuries; iii) the 
physical factors involved in avoiding the accident; and iv) the possible 
factors (physical or not) that might have mitigated or avoided injuries. 
The final result is a supportable set of conclusions that describe what 
happened, how injuries occurred, and whether anything could have 
been [d]one either before or during the accident to avoid those inju-
ries. 
Sullivan, supra note 2, at 198 (footnotes ommitted). 
49. Vincent Schneider's testimony, on the method of reconstructing pre-
accident speeds, in pertinent part, is as follows: 
In this case the evidence was pretty clear. By determining the type 
and weight of the vehicles, the nature and condition of the road sur-
face at the time of impact and the distance the vehicles moved after 
the impact, we can determine quite accurately how fast the pizza 
truck was moving at the instant it hit the Mustang. We can do this 
by using a principle of simple physics called coefficient of friction. By 
measuring the length of the scroll marks, which show the distance the 
vehicles slid along the pavement after impact, and knowing the 
amount of frictional resistance such a pavement, when dry, would of-
fer to these sliding vehicles, we can calculate the initial velocity of the 
truck when the vehicles came together. In this case, the marks left by 
the tires of both vehicles show that they were in a locked-wheel, side-
ways skid. As you can see from the table marked Plaintiffs Exhibit 
14, the appropriate coefficient offriction to use under those conditions 
is .70. [Schneider indicates by pointing to the line on the chart for 
traveled dry road when vehicles were traveling in excess of 30 M.P.H.] 
If, for example, the accident had occurred under snow conditions, the 
tables we engineers use for this purpose would call for a coefficient 
half that large. [Schneider indicates the chart line for snow packed 
roads.] Based on all this, my analysis shows that the pizza truck was 
traveling 50 M.P.H. at the moment of impact. We took great pains to 
verify the characteristics of the vehicles and the road surface, and we 
ran many tests to check the data. 
For a discussion of two common methods of estimating speed in accident 
reconstruction cases, see Lawrence F. Mazer et al., Expert Testimony Regarding 
the Speed of a Vehicle: The Status of North Carolina Law and the State of the 
Art, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 191, 199-203 (1994). 
50. Among the assumptions that Schneider included in the simulation is 
the assumption that Dawn started her turn from a position flush with S.R. 38, 
an assumption that was newly contradicted by Will Drummond's testimony. 
Schneider argues that his assumption is more favorable to the defendant be-
cause it would require the plaintiff less time to cross the lane of traffic from 
this position rather than from the stop sign which was 26 feet back from the 
road. 
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distance the vehicles traveled after the collision on a dry pavement 
indicates an impact speed of 50 M.P.H. 
a. Base. In the Base version of the simulated trial tape, 
Schneider supports his testimony by introducing seven animated 
computer simulations of the accident. These simulations demon-
strated graphically that, if Drummond had obeyed the advisory 
speed sign of 40 M.P.H., there would have been a clean miss of 
sixty-two feet. These computer simulations were developed for, and 
used in, the underlying trial. Schneider narrates the animated 
simulations as they appear on the videotape: 
i. Simulation 1: Shows an overhead view of the accident 
scene with the Torino truck proceeding westbound at 55 M.P.H. and 
then slowing to 50 M.P.H. as the driver reacts to the Mustang pull-
ing out. This simulation represents Schneider's conclusion of how 
the accident actually occurred. 
u. Simulation 2: Shows the same view in slow motion.51 
In. Simulation 3: Shows the same events as simulation 1 from 
the perspective of the driver. 52 
iv. Simulation 4: Shows the overhead view again with the 
truck proceeding at a steady 40 M.P.H., and illustrates a clean miss 
by sixty-one to sixty-two feet.53 
v. Simulation 5: The action is the same as simulation 4, but 
the action is stopped at 3.45 seconds to emphasize the space exist-
ing between the two vehicles at that point in time.54 
vi. Simulations 6 and 7: Repeat simulations 4 and 5, only the 
truck is moving at a steady 45 M.P.H. There is no impact, but the 
miss is much closer than at 40 M.P.H. 
b. Variant. In the Variant version of the simulated trial 
tape, Schneider's testimony is substantially the same, but the jury 
is shown no animated computer simulations. Instead Schneider 
51. As already indicated, the ability to highlight the elements of the scene 
using slow motion and stop action is one of the perceived benefits of simula-
tions and its persuasive effects on jurors. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
52. As previously indicated, the ability to shift perspectives and to show a 
scene from different vantage points is a frequently cited benefit to computer-
generated displays. See supra text accompanying note 18. 
53. The ability to change parameters and assumptions, particularly in 
events with complex relationships to each other, as already indicated, is a dis-
tinct advantage of computer simulations. See supra text accompanying note 20. 
54. This is another illustration of the use of stop action in collision simula-
tion. See supra text accompanying note 19. 
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shows an aerial photograph of the intersection and a road profile 
chart and describes the results of calculations based on alternative 
assumptions.55 His description of his qualifications, methods, as-
sumptions, and conclusions is unchanged. Schneider concludes his 
testimony by assigning 100% of the fault of the accident to Torino's 
driver. 
6. Testimony of Neil Sundstrom 
The plaintiff's expert authority on truck-driving safety, Neil 
Sundstrom, testifies that Drummond's safety training was woefully 
deficient, but that no training requirement laws were violated by 
Torino. He testifies that a trained driver would have immediately 
slowed and covered his brakes as soon as he saw Dawn's car moving 
toward S.R. 38 from the stop sign. 
7. Testimony of Penny McKey 
Penny McKey, the mother of the plaintiff, testifies about the 
horrendous burdens the family has suffered because of Dawn's slow 
and painful physical rehabilitation and her permanent mental im-
pairments, seizures, and anti-social personality disorders. 
8. Testimony of Carla Trammell 
The plaintiffs expert clinical neuropsychologist, Carla Tram-
mell, summarizes Dawn's post-accident medical history, and de-
scribes her current and permanent loss of mental function. Tram-
mell also operates Indiana's only rehabilitation facility for these 
55. The testimony of Schneider is revised in pertinent part as follows: 
Jackson: You have testified that you assumed that Mr. Drummond 
crested the hill at 55 M.P.H. and continued down at that speed. You 
also testified that your scientific analysis of the accident site yielded 
an impact speed of 50 M.P.H. In your expert testimony, does this 
scenario reflect accurately the events as you believe they actually 
happened? 
Schneider: Yes, I believe it does. 
Jackson: Mr. Schneider, have you considered alternative scenarios in 
which Mr. Drummond proceeded differently than he apparently did? 
Schneider: Yes. In the first alternative we have the truck slowing 
down to 40 M.P.H. at the warning sign and staying at that speed 
thereafter. At 40 [M.P.H.] there is no collision and Ia] miss is not 
even close; I calculated about 62 feet of clearance. In the second al-
ternative, we have the truck moving at a steady 45 M.P.H. Again 
there is a miss, but closer, of course. In the third alternative, Mr. 
Drummond is moving initially at 55 [M.P.H.] but when he sees the 
Mustang pull out he removes his foot completely from the accelerator. 
In this scenario there is a complete miss. 
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types of injuries and discusses the expense of a rehabilitation pro-
gram for Dawn. 
9. Testimony of Arnold Eagleton 
The plaintiffs expert economist, Arnold Eagleton, projects 
Dawn's range of economic damages for lost income based on her 
probable work-life expectancy and for the costs she will incur for 
lifetime residential care for her full life expectancy. To these he 
adds medical and rehabilitation costs. Following Eagleton's testi-
mony, the plaintiff rests. 
10. Testimony of Stanton Kramer 
Defendant's expert accident reconstructionist, Stanton Kramer, 
testifies that his "momentum analysis" of the physical evidence 
yields an impact speed of 30 to 35 M.P.H. He opines that there was 
no time, even at that speed, for Drummond to react. He testifies 
that only a very cautious driver would have reacted to Dawn's 
moving from the stop sign. Following Kramer's testimony, the de-
fense rests. 
11. Plaintiffs first closing argument 
Plaintiffs attorney reviews his theory of the case and how the 
testimony from the plaintiffs witnesses' supports it. He admits 
some fault on Dawn's part, but argues that Torino and the State 
were more responsible for the collision. With respect to damages, 
plaintiffs attorney recapitulates the figures of the economist. He 
adds a range of non-economic damages including pain and suffering 
that Dawn will incur over her life expectancy. 
12. Defendant's closing argument 
The defendant's attorney reminds the jury not to be swayed by 
sympathy. He attacks the plaintiffs accident reconstruction, which 
assumed that Dawn stopped once at the edge of S.R. 38. He empha-
sizes Drummond's good driving record and argues that Drummond 
had no reason to be rushed or distracted by his job or his suspen-
sion. He focuses the jury's attention on Dawn's failure to look left 
again before she turned left. He emphasizes that S.R. 38 is a pre-
ferred road to County Road 1040. In the Base version, he misrepre-
sents the amount of a miss shown on the animated simulation at 40 
M.P.H. as two rather than sixty-two feet. In both cases, he attacks 
the assumptions of the plaintiffs economist, suggesting that Dawn 
might not have been headed for college, nor is she certain to be 
permanently unemployable, or need lifetime residential care. 
13. Plaintiffs final closing argument 
In this rebuttal argument, plaintiffs attorney explains to the 
jury that the assumptions about Dawn's stopping point do not affect 
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Dawn's case; either assumption leads to a "clean miss" if Drum-
mond had just slowed down or braked. In the Base version, he de-
nies the defense attorney's two-foot-miss assertion. He emphasizes 
that, despite having the right of way, a driver on the preferred road 
is negligent if he or she fails to react to conflicting traffic moving 
from a dead stop in the direction of S.R. 38. He derides Torino's 
failure to call experts to rebut plaintiffs damages experts, and de-
mands that the jury accept plaintiffs uncontested evidence. Addi-
tionally, he attacks the big company mentality that denies having 
made mistakes when they cost the company money. Finally, he 
concludes with an emotional description of Dawn's loss. 
14. Jury instructions 
Judge Barton reads aloud twenty-two instructions taken from 
the underlying case, copies of which each juror has been given. The 
jurors are to read the instructions silently along with the judge and 
are permitted to bring them into the deliberation rooms. Several 
instructions, taken from Indiana pattern instructions, define 
"comparative fault," "negligence," "agent of the defendant," 
"preponderance of the evidence," ''burden of proof," "proximate 
cause," "ordinary care," and "sole proximate cause." Judge Barton 
reads the relevant Indiana statutes, sets out the various common 
law duties, and instructs the jury how both are to be applied. He 
lists possible items of damages and informs the jury that Dawn's life 
eA1>ectancy is 63.7 years. He also explains the nature of expert 
opinion and tells the jury it must render a unanimous verdict. 
The trial of the underlying case took thirteen days and gener-
ated 4000 pages of trial transcript. The McKey simulation, however, 
runs about four hours. In McKey, the number of witnesses was re-
duced, rebuttal evidence was incorporated into direct and cross-
examination, long medical depositions were summarized and inte-
grated into one witness's testimony, and all motions, objections, and 
sidebars were deleted. Despite the simplification and compression, 
we believe that all significant factual issues were preserved. 
a. Study #1. 
i. Subjects. Mock jurors were 525 students recruited from 
several colleges across the Midwest.56 Most of the students were 
sophomores or juniors enrolled in their institutions' business pro-
grams. They volunteered for the McKey exercise in conjunction with 
56. All jurors were "jury-eligible" with respect to age. These student juries 
were no doubt younger than those typically encountered in the "real world," but 
they were older on average than might be surmised from their sopho-
more/junior status. 
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their introductory business law course.57 As a group, they had little 
or no exposure to comparative fault principles. Of the 525 mock ju-
rors, 296 saw the Base case in which Schneider (an expert witness 
for the plaintiff) supplemented his testimony with a series of com-
puter simulations. The other 229 mock jurors saw the Variant set 
of tapes in which Schneider's testimony did not include the com-
puter simulations. Instead, the Variant form was composed of 
Schneider's oral testimony supplemented with a set of pictures, 
charts, and an aerial photograph of the accident scene.68 
ii. Manipulating the independent variable. Our independent 
variable (the computer simulation) was manipulated via Vincent 
Schneider's testimony.59 In the Base version of the simulation, 
Schneider's testimony included the seven animated computer 
simulations of the accident. In' the Variant version of our study, 
Schneider's content delivery remained essentially unchanged from 
the Base version, but the juries did not see the computer simula-
tions. Instead, the juries saw an aerial photograph of the highway 
intersection, along with Schneider's verbal descriptions and analy-
• 60 SIS. 
iii. Hypotheses (H) and experimental results (ER) based on the 
verdict data. In the experimental framework that we have de-
scribed, the Variant juries may draw conclusions that differ from 
the Base juries in several ways. Relative to the Base juries, the 
Variant juries may: (1) allocate a different percentage of fault to 
both defendants combined (i.e., Torino and the State of Indiana); (2) 
allocate a different percentage of fault to Torino, the defendant 
company; (3) allocate a different percentage of fault to the State of 
Indiana; (4) allocate a different percentage of fault to Dawn McKey, 
the plaintiff; (5) award a different dollar award to Dawn Mckey; 
andlor (6) award a different total damage award. 
Inspection of Table 1 (Base case) and Table 2 (Variant case) in-
dicates that forty-five juries61 who participated saw the Base case 
and thirty-eightjuries62 who participated in the study saw the Vari-
ant version of the simulation. Tables 1 and 2 also present basic de-
scriptive statistics (i.e., mean, median, and standard deviation). 
We developed a set of six hypotheses predicting how each de-
pendent variable-of-interest would be influenced by Schneider's 
57. For a description of the use of the empirical research project within the 
classroom setting, see Robert B. Bennett, Jr. et al., Using a Jury Simulation As 
a Classroom Exercise, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. EDUC. 191 (1997). 
58. For a script of Schneider's testimony, see supra note 55. 
59. Recall that Schneider served as the plaintiffs expert accident recon-
struction witness. See supra Part ILB.5. 
60. See supra Part n.B.5.b. 
61. Table 1, col. 1. 
62. Table 2, col. 1. 
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computer simulation. Subsequent to each of the following hypothe-
ses, we provide the experimental results and brief explanations of 
the experimental outcomes. 
Our rationale across all six hypotheses is based on the premise 
that, given the complexity of the case, a visual tool such as the com-
puter simulation should help jurors conclude that, if Will Drum-
mond had slowed down, he could have avoided the accident. Moreo-
ver, there was a road sign warning him to take heed. If the 
computer simulation was effective, as we have posited, those juries 
who saw the computer simulation should be inclined to apportion a 
greater percentage of fault to Will Drummond and possibly higher 
dollar damages. 
Ht : Those juries who saw the computer simulations will allocate 
a greater percentage of fault to the combined defendants (i.e., Tor-
ino plus the State of Indiana), compared to the juries who did not 
see the computer simulations. 
ERt : The empirical evidence reported in Tables 1 and 2 does not 
support our first hypothesis. Variant juries allocated 37.3% of the 
fault to the defendants combined. &3 Our sample of Base juries allo-
cated 36.2% of the fault to the defendants combined.64 We con-
ducted a difference of means test (t-test for small samplest5 to as-
sess whether the observed difference (i.e., 37.3% versus 36.2%) was 
statistically significant. We concluded that Schneider's computer 
simulations did not cause juries to apportion more fault to the de-
fendants combined. The observed t-value was only t=0.18 (d.f.=79), 
yielding an observed p-value ofp=0.43, considerably larger than our 
0.05 critical p-value. Based on the evidence, it appears that juries 
apportion about one-third of the accident's blame to the combined 
defendants, regardless of whether they saw Schneider's computer 
simulations. 
~: Juries who saw the computer simulation will apportion a 
greater percentage of fault to Torino, compared to those juries who 
did not see the computer simulations. 
ERz: The empirical evidence reported in Tables 1 and 2 does not 
support our second hypothesis. Variant juries allocated 21.2% of 
63. See id. coL 6. 
64. See Table 1, col. 6. 
65. This test (two-sample difference of means test) is appropriate when one 
wishes to compare two observed sample means to statistically assess whether 
two different samples came from populations having equal means. See DONALD 
L. BARNETI', STATISTICAL METHODS 376-78 (3d ed. 1982). In this instance we 
used the t-distribution and the corresponding t-test difference of means, be-
cause we operate under the assumption that the population variances are not 
known. Inasmuch as we used the sample variances, the t-test is appropriate. 
For a more thorough discussion of this test, see id. at 345-88, and UMA 
SEKARAN, RESEARCH METHODS FOR BUSINESS: A SKILL BUILDING APPROACH 249-
50 (2d ed. 1992). 
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the fault to Torino,66 compared to 17.2% by the Base sample.67 A dif-
ference of means test yielded a t-value of only t=0.99 and a p-value 
of p=0.16, well above our critical p-value of 0.05. The observed dif-
ferences from our samples of jurors are not statistically significant. 
Therefore, our study suggests that Schneider's computer simulation 
did not cause jurors to apportion more blame to Torino. Regardless 
of whether juries saw the computer simulations, they tend to appor-
tion a small amount of blame to Torino, finding the pizza company 
only about one-fifth to blame for the accident. 
Ha: Juries who saw the computer simulations will apportion a 
greater percentage of fault to the State of Indiana, compared to 
those juries who did not see the computer simulations.6s 
ERa: The empirical evidence does not support our hypothesis. 
Those juries who did not see the computer simulations apportioned 
16.1% of the blame to the State,69 while those juries who saw the 
simulations apportioned 19.0% responsibility to the State.70 Our 
difference of means test yielded a t-value of only t=0.78 and an ob-
served p-value of p=0.44. Regardless of whether juries saw Schnei-
der's computer simulations, they tended to apportion a very small 
amount of blame to the State, finding the State less than one-fifth 
at fault in the accident. 
H4: Juries who saw the computer simulation will apportion a 
lower percentage of fault to Dawn McKey, the plaintiff in the case, 
compared to those juries who did not see the computer simulations. 
ER~: Base juries apportioned 63.8% of the fault to Dawn 
McKey. 1 Those juries who did not see the computer simulations 
(Variant juries) apportioned 62.7% of the blame to Dawn McKey. 72 
To compare these two groups, we performed a difference of means t-
test, which yielded a t-value of t=0.18 and an observed p-value of 
p=0.43. Based on the evidence provided from this study, it appears 
the computer simulations did not cause juries to apportion less 
blame to Dawn McKey. Regardless of whether juries saw the com-
puter simulations, they found Dawn McKey to be about two-thirds 
responsible for the accident . 
. H5: Dawn McKey, the plaintiff in the case, will receive a larger 
damage award (in dollars) by those juries who viewed Schneider's 
66. See Table 2, col. 2. 
67. See Table 1, col. 2. 
68. This hypothesis was tested solely for analytical completeness. The 
animated computer simulation and the testimony of the accident reconstruc-
tionist focus on the fault of the corporate defendant, Torino. Therefore, intui-
tively the apportionment of fault to the State should not be affected by the 
simulation. 
69. See Table 2, col. 4. 
70. See Table 1, col. 4. 
71. See id. col. 8. 
72. See Table 2, col. 8. 
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computer simulations (Base case) than those juries who did not see 
the computer simulations (Variant case). 
ERG: It appears the computer simulations did not cause juries to 
award a larger damage award in dollars to Dawn McKey. Those ju-
ries who did not see the simulations awarded, on average, $1.69 
million to Dawn,73 while those who saw the simulations awarded 
$1.63 million to her.74 Our difference of means test yielded an ob-
served t-value of only t=O.15 and a p-value of p=O.44. Regardless of 
whether juries saw the computer simulations, they tended to award 
about $1.6 to 1.7 million to the plaintiff, Dawn McKey. 
H6: Those juries who saw Schneider's computer simulations will 
award a higher total damage award, compared to those juries who 
did not see the computer simulations. 
ER.,: Once again, our experimental results do not support our 
hypothesis. The average total damage award by the Base juries was 
$3.64 million,75 compared to $3.32 million for the Variant juries.76 
The observed t-value was only t=O.58, yielding an observed p-value 
of p=O.28 (t-test difference of means). Thus, it appears that juries 
tended to award about $3.5 million in damages, regardless of 
whether they viewed Schneider's computer simulations. 
iv. Summing up the experimental results to Study #1. Con-
trary to our expectations, this study provides strong empirical evi-
dence that the computer simulations were ineffective in causing ju-
ries to apportion more or less responsibility to any of the parties. In 
the current study, regardless of whether juries saw the computer 
simulations, they tended to apportion about one-third of the fault to 
the combined defendants and two-thirds of the fault to the plaintiff, 
Dawn McKey. We also found that dollar damages were invariant 
across both samples, with the amount of total damages being in the 
$3.3 to 3.6 million range. 
We examined the exit surveys of those jurors who had seen 
Schneider's computer simulations to see how jurors felt about them. 
Included in the exit survey were two questions that inquired 
whether the computer simulations had influenced individuals' ap-
portionment of fault and their entire jury panel's apportionment of 
fault.77 Jurors were generally neutral as to the influence of the 
73. See ide col. 7. 
74. See Table 1, col. 7. 
75. See ide col. 10. 
76. See Table 2, col. 10. 
77. The exit survey questions read as follows: 
1. The animated computer simulation of the accident presented by 
Vincent Schneider influenced me to increase the percentage of fault I 
would attribute to the Torino Pizza Company. 
2. The animated computer simulation of the accident presented by 
Vincent Schneider influenced my jury panel to increase the percentage 
offault it attributed to the Torino Pizza Company. 
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computer simulations in apportionment of fault, with observed 
means of 3.10 ("influenced my individual apportionment of fault") 
and 3.35 ("influenced my jury panel's apportionment of fault") on a 
5-point scale (l="strongly disagree"; 5="strongly agree,,).78 
While it is informative to learn that jurors were generally am-
bivalent as to the effect of the computer simulations on their appor-
tionments, we do not know why the computer simulations were gen-
erally ineffective. Our contrary findings may have resulted from 
several possibilities. First, it is possible that Schneider's computer 
simulations used in the current study were simply not high enough 
quality to influence those who saw them.79 Second, computer simu-
78. The Base jurors were generally ambivalent as to the influence of the 
computer simulation on their verdicts. Only 38% of the respondents indicated 
they agreed or strongly agreed with the statement, Ulfhe animated computer 
simulation of the accident presented by Vincent Schneider influenced me to in-
crease the percentage of fault I would attribute to Torino Pizza Company." 
Only 23% of those same respondents agreed or strongly agreed with the state-
ment, Ulfhe animated computer simulation of the accident presented by Vincent 
Schneider influenced my jury panel to increase the percentage offault it attrib-
uted to Torino Pizza Company." 
The average score for the question, "The animated computer simulation of 
the accident presented by Vincent Schneider influenced me to increase the per-
centage of fault I would attribute to Torino Pizza Company" was 3.10 on a 5-
point scale (l::="strongly disagree"; 5="strongly agree"). The average score for 
the question, "The animated computer simulation of the accident presented by 
Vincent Schneider influenced my jury panel to increase the percentage of fault 
it attributed to Torino Pizza Company," was 3.35 on a 5-point scale (l="strongly 
disagree"; 5="strongly agree"). Thus, those who saw Schneider's computer 
simulations were generally ambivalent as to the degree of influence the simula-
tions had on the allocation of fault to Torino. 
79. Both groups (Base and Variant) felt the videotaped trial was fairly re-
alistic. In response to the question, "The videotaped trial presentation was re-
alistic," the average score by those in the Base group was 2.72 on a 5-point 
scale. The average score for the Variant jurors was 2.83. The 5-point scale was 
anchored at l="strongly disagree" and 5="strongly agree." Thus, a score of 
about 2.80 was slightly better than mid-range on the 5-point scale. A difference 
of means test between the groups was statistically non-significant (t=0.38). 
Regarding the statement, "The videotaped trial presentation was realis-
tic," 55% of the Base respondents and 50% of the Variant respondents either 
"agreed" or "strongly agreed." Both groups (Base and Variant) felt their delib-
erations were conducted similarly to that of a real trial. In response to the 
question, "Our jury panel's deliberations were conducted as if this were a real 
trial," the average score by those in the Base group was 2.40 on a 5-point scale. 
The average score for the Variant jurors was 2.37. Thus, a score of about 2.40 
was slightly better than mid-range on the 5-point scale. A difference of means 
test between the groups was statistically non-significant (t=1.10). 
Of those in the Variant group 63% and of those in the Base group 62% ei-
ther indicated they "agreed" or "strongly agreed" with the question, "Our jury 
panel's deliberations were conducted as if this were a real trial." 
Evidence from the exit surveys suggests both groups felt their verdicts and 
damage apportionment were comparable to a real jury setting. In response to 
the question, "A real jury at a real trial would likely have reached approxi-
mately the same result as that reached by my jury panel," average responses 
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lations may not influence juries. Our supposition that computer 
simulations would facilitate jurors' cognitive processing may simply 
be incorrect. Possibly we underrated jurors' abilities, or we may 
have over-estimated the attractiveness of computer simulations. 
The third plausible explanation may be that the computer simula-
tions really influence jurors when they see them, but then subse-
quent testimony ''blurs" the effects of the computer simulations.so 
That is, at the point in the trial where the Base jurors saw Schnei-
der's computer simulations, while the Variant jurors only heard 
Schneider's testimony and saw the aerial photograph, maybe the 
experimental groups did actually differ. However, this was only 
about one-third of the way through the entire trial. The testimony 
and other activities subsequent to the introduction of the computer 
simulations may have diminished the effects of the computer simu-
lations. A final possibility is that computer simulations may facili-
tate juror understanding, but the same understanding may be 
achieved by alternative means, particularly when issues lie within 
the range of jurors' experiences. Therefore, the simulations did not 
shift the results, because sufficient understanding was accom-
plished by conventional expert testimony alone. 
Given these plausible explanations regarding why our experi-
mental results were not as expected, we decided to conduct a second 
study to further investigate these possibilities. 
b. Study #2. Study #2 was again comprised of two groups, a 
Base group and a Variant group. The Base jurors viewed the video-
tapes that included Schneider's presentation of the computer simu-
lations as part of his expert witness testimony on behalf of the 
plaintiff.s1 The Variant jurors heard Schneider's testimony and saw 
an aerial photograph of the accident scene, but they did not see his 
t . I' 82 compu er Slmu atlOns. 
The procedures for our second study essentially replicated those 
described for our initial study, with several substantive exceptions. 
First, the jurors did not hear any testimony or closing arguments 
were 2.55 for Base jurors and 2.47 for Variant jurors (5-point scale). Thus, a 
score of about 2.50 was slightly better than mid-range on the 5-point scale. A 
difference of means test between the groups was statistically non-significant 
(t=0.98). 
In reaching the the question, "A real jury at a real trial would likely have 
reached approximately the same result as that reached by my jury panel," 53% 
of the Base jurors and 63% of the Variant jurors either indicated they "agreed" 
or "strongly agreed." 
80. See supra text accompanying note 35. The total running time of the 
seven computer simulations in McKey v. Torino Pizza Co., is approximately two 
minutes of the simulation, which lasts for approximately four hours. 
81. See supra Part II.B.5.a. 
82. See supra Part II.B.5.b. 
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following Schneider's testimony.s3 After Schneider's testimony, ju-
rors received the judge's instructions relative to apportionment of 
fault.84 Second, rather than randomly assigning students to jury 
panels, we asked the students to individually deliberate. Third, 
since the jurors did not hear testimony about the extent of Dawn 
McKey's injuries or the anticipated costs of her care, we only asked 
them to apportion the percent of damages (across Torino, the State 
of Indiana, and Dawn McKey). We also did not ask them to decide 
on a total dollar damage award. Subsequent to Schneider's testi-
mony and receiving the instructions from the judge, mockjurors in-
dividually apportioned fault, completed an apportionment of dam-
ages form, and responded to a set of exit survey questions 
(comparable to the exit survey administered to participants in 
Study #185). Finally, we amended the exit survey form by adding an 
item that assessed whether jurors thought Schneider's computer 
simulations were high-quality. 
i. Subjects. Our second study was comprised of 104 mock ju-
rors. Forty-three of those jurors were assigned to the Base sample 
(i.e., they saw Schneider's testimony with the computer simula-
tions), and sixty-one jurors did not see the computer simulations, 
but they did hear his testimony. We recruited our mock jurors for 
Study #2 in the same manner as we had done for Study #1 (i.e., 
primarily business students who were enrolled in an introductory 
law class). 
ii. Manipulating the independent variable: "including the 
computer simulations in Schneider's testimony." As indicated in our 
introduction of Study #2, we manipulated our independent variable-
of-interest (i.e., the computer simulations) by including it in the 
Base version and omitting it from the Variant version. 
iii. Dependent variables (DV)) hypotheses (B)) and experimen-
tal results based on the verdict data: In Study #2 we were essen-
tially interested in whether jurors felt Schneider's computer simula-
tions were high quality and whether they influenced jurors' 
apportionment of damages across Torino, the State of Indiana, and 
Dawn McKey. The hypotheses that follow are generally predicated 
on the rationale that jurors who saw Schneider's computer simula-
tion will apportion less fault to Dawn McKey and more fault to the 
defendants because the computer simulations provide rather clear 
evidence that if Will Drummond had slowed to an appropriate speed 
he would have avoided the collision. 
83. In other words, both groups viewed the trial only through part five. See 
supra Part II.B.5. 
84. Because the jurors in Study #2 had heard no testimony related to dam-
ages, all instructions related to determination of damages were omitted. 
85. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text. 
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Table 3 (Base case) and Table 4 (Variant case) present the em-
pirical results from Study #2 together with basic descriptive statis-
tics (i.e., mean, median, and standard deviation). 
Given our rationale for the experimental effect in Study #2 is 
the same as the rationale that we presented for Study #1, the first 
four hypotheses that we examine in Study #2 are essentially the 
same as those we presented in Study #l. 
HI: Those juries who saw the computer simulations will allocate 
a greater percentage of fault to the combined defendants (i.e., Tor-
ino and the State of Indiana), compared to the juries who did not see 
the computer simulations. 
ER1: The empirical evidence reported in Tables 3 and 4 does not 
support our first hypothesis. In our Base case, jurors allocated 
60.2% of the fault to the defendants combined.86 Our sample of 
Variant jurors (those who did not see Schneider's computer simula-
tions) allocated 57.25% of the fault to the defendants combined.s7 
We conducted a difference of means test (t-test for small samples) to 
assess whether the observed difference (i.e., 60.2% versus 57.25%) 
was statistically significant. AB a result of the difference of means 
test, we concluded the computer simulations did not cause juries to 
allocate more fault to the defendants combined. The observed t-
value was only t=0.50 (d.f.=102), yielding an observed p-value of 
p=0.31, considerably larger than our 0.05 critical p-value. Based on 
the evidence, it appears that, individually, jurors apportioned about 
60% of the accident's blame to the defendants, regardless of whether 
they saw Schneider's computer simulations. 
~: Juries who saw the computer simulation will apportion a 
greater percentage of fault to Torino, compared to those juries who 
did not see the computer simulations. 
ER2: The empirical evidence reported in Tables 3 and 4 does not 
support our second hypothesis. In our Base sample, jurors allocated 
43.2% of the fault to Torino,88 compared to 39.1% in the Variant ver-
sion.89 A difference of means test yielded a t-value of only t=O.80 
and a p-value of p=0.21, well above our critical p-value of 0.05. 
Therefore, our study suggests that Schneider's computer simulation 
did not cause jurors to apportion more blame to Torino. The ob-
served difference from our samples of jurors is not statistically sig-
nificant. Regardless of whether jurors saw Schneider's computer 
simulations, they allocated about 40 to 45% of the fault to Torino. 
H3: Juries who saw the computer simulations will apportion a 
greater percentage of fault to the State of Indiana, compared to 
those juries who did not see the computer simulations. 
86. See Table 3, col. 4. 
87. See Table 4, col. 4. 
88. See Table 3, col. 2. 
89. See Table 4, col. 2. 
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ERa: The empirical evidence does not support our hypothesis. 
Those jurors who saw Schneider's computer simulations appor-
tioned 17% of the blame to the State,90 while those jurors who did 
not see the simulations apportioned 18.1% responsibility to the 
State.91 Our difference of means test yielded a t-value of only t=0.31 
and an observed p-value of p=0.38. Regardless of whether jurors 
saw Schneider's computer simulations, they tended to apportion a 
very small amount of blame to the State, finding the State less than 
20% at fault in the accident. 
H4: Juries who saw the computer simulation will apportion a 
lower percentage of fault to Dawn McKey, the plaintiff in the case, 
compared to those juries who did not see the computer simulations. 
ER4: The jurors who saw the computer simulations apportioned 
39.8% of the fault to Dawn McKey.92 Those jurors who did not see 
the computer simulations apportioned 42.75% of the blame to Dawn 
McKey.93 To compare these two groups, we performed a t-test dif-
ference of means test, which yielded a t-value of t=0.50 and an ob-
served p-value ofp=0.31. Based on the evidence provided from this 
study, it appears the computer simulation did not cause jurors to 
apportion less blame to Dawn McKey. Regardless of whether they 
saw the computer simulations, jurors found Dawn Mckey to be 
about 40% responsible for the accident. 
H5: Base jurors will indicate that they felt the computer simula-
tions were a high-quality piece of evidence. 
ER5: The evidence obtained from our exit surveys supports this 
hypothesis. Those jurors who saw Schneider's computer simula-
tions felt they were high quality pieces of evidence. The average 
score to the item, "The actual computer simulation was a high 
quality piece of evidence," was 2.04 on a 5-point scale. The scale 
was anchored at l="strongly agree" and 5="strongly disagree". 
Thus, the closer a score is to 1, the left anchor, the more strongly re-
spondents agree with the statement. A score statistically different 
from 3 (the midpoint on a 5-point scale) would provide strong evi-
dence that jurors felt the computer simulations were high quality. 
We conducted a difference of means test, comparing our observed 
mean (2.04) to our hypothesized mean (3.0) and obtained at-value 
of t=6.04 with a p-value of p=O.OO. Given our observed mean was 
significantly better than the midpoint on the scale, we concluded 
that jurors felt Schneider's computer simulations were high-
l 't 94 qua I y. 
90. See Table 3, col. 3. 
91. See Table 4, col. 3. 
92. See Table 3, col. 5. 
93. See Table 4, col. 5. 
94. This result is consistent with the authors' views of the computer simu-
lation and the view of the jurors in the underlying trial. 
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iv. Summing up the experimental results to Study #2. 
Counter to our hypotheses, our results again suggest that the com-
puter simulation did not significantly influence apportionment of 
damages between the defendants and the plaintiff in this case. We 
were somewhat surprised at the experimental results of Study #2 
because: (1) we terminated the video in Study #2 immediately after 
Schneider's testimony, a point in the experimental procedure when 
the effect of the computer simulations should be at their maxi-
mum;95 and (2) empirical evidence suggests that jurors felt the com-
puter simulations were indeed high quality. 
III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
As initially discussed, the extraordinary possibilities inherent 
in computer animations and computer simulations raised hopes-
and fears-that juries would find computer-generated displays more 
persuasive or convincing than other forms of evidence.96 These 
hopes and fears seem to be unwarranted, at least within the context 
of the empirical results of this study. In other words, computer-
generated evidence is not a "silver bullet" which guarantees victory. 
Certainly there is still the possibility that such evidence could get 
lost in the "noise" of a long and complex trial; but, the results of our 
second study indicate that this is not a complete explanation. 
Possible explanations may again come from social science re-
search. Recall that the marked advantage of visually presented in-
formation or visually and orally presented information was in the 
retention of the information.97 Therefore, it is possible that the 
computer simulation would stand out more, as compared to oral tes-
timony only, following a more extended period of time between the 
testimony and jury deliberations.9s However, with a jury composed 
of a number of individuals, the memory of the relevant evidence 
would arguably have to fade from the collective consciousness. If 
the evidence were significant to anyone of the jurors, he or she 
would be in a position to remind the remainder. 
95. It is noteworthy that jurors in Study #2 allocated considerably less 
fault to Dawn McKey and considerably more fault to Torino than did jurors in 
Study #1. Removing the defense evidence and the arguments may have had a 
major effect on the apportionment even if the computer simulations did not. 
This result would seem contrary to some earlier studies, which suggest that ju-
rors tend to form their opinions very early in the trial. See Gerbasi et al., supra 
note 39, at 324-25. However, it is consistent with research, that suggests jury 
deliberation has a moderating effect on jury results. See Melissa A. Pigott & 
Linda A. Foley, Social Influence in Jury Decision Making, 18 TRIAL DIPL. J. 101, 
102 (1995). 
96. See supra Part I. 
97. See supra text accompanying notes 15-16. 
98. In both studies, the deliberations and/or determinations were made 
within hours of witnessing the testimony. 
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A more likely explanation, again borne out by social science re-
search, is that jurors, both individually and collectively, construct a 
"story" from the evidence and remember the evidence that is consis-
tent with the "story" and selectively ignore the remainder.99 There-
fore, the job of counsel and their expert witnesses is to build a per-
suasive story for the jurors. Once the story is built, any additional 
or more persuasive evidence merely becomes superfluous and does 
not alter the jurors' apportionment. In other words, if the expert 
witness can make his points in a ''low tech" fashion, the high tech 
presentation is simply overkill.loo Given the expense of producing 
quality simulations,101 this may not be an insignificant considera-
tion. 
In the typical accident case, such as McKey, the essential facts 
are not beyond the scope of the average juror. Most jurors within 
the sample and within the jury pool of most jurisdictions were li-
censed, and even experienced, drivers. Therefore, the jurors will be 
able to grasp the facts and issues at hand as long as they are clearly 
laid out. Jurors can build their story without the wizardry of com-
puter animation or simulation.I02 Arguably, if the issues in a case 
concerned matters outside the experience of ordinary jurors, com-
puter-aided graphics would be much more helpful. lo3 Further em-
99. For a detailed treatment of this notion, see Brown, supra note 39, at 
1216-21, King, supra note 39, at 78, Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Evidence 
Evaluation in Complex Decision Making, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
242, 243-54 (1986), and Pennington & Hastie, Practical Implications, supra 
note 39, at 93-98. 
100. Without intending to minimize the difficulty of the task of the accident 
reconstructionist, accident reconstruction need not be a high technology ven-
ture. See supra notes 48-49. See generally RANDy W. KING & LARRy W. 
SPEARMAN, PuBLIC AGENCY TRAINING COUNCIL, ADVANCED APPLICATIONS IN 
TRAFFIC ACCIDENT INvESTIGATION, PHAsE II-MODULE 1: MINIMUM SPEEDS FROM 
SKIDS (1993) (explaining how to determine coefficients of friction using a drag 
sled constructed from a tire filled with concrete). 
101. See Berkoff, supra note 7, at 852 (citing costs of $1000 to $4000 per sec-
ond for computer simulations); Gahtan, supra note 35 (citing average costs of 
$1000 per second for computer animations); see also Holden, supra note 37, at 
61 (citing ranges for costs); Brown, supra note 2, at 19 ("The use of the tools is 
usually driven by the size ofthe case."). 
102. In fact, one consultant on the project, Professor Laura Ginger of Indi-
ana University (Bloomington), speculates that the more computer literate that 
jurors are, the less impressed that they may be with computer simulations. 
Although Barry Sullivan argues a contrary position, he acknowledges the 
problem: "A [Computer Generated Re-enactment] is only as good as the under-
lying eyewitness testimony, physical data, and engineering assumptions that 
drive its images. In other words, the old computer maxim 'garbage in, garbage 
out,' applies to CGRs." Sullivan, supra note 2, at 195. The more sophisticated 
audience is acutely aware of this principle. 
103. David J. Richter stated: 
In general, the cases best suited to animations include the following: 
• intellectual property/patent infringement; 
o reconstruction of aviation or automobile accidents; and [sic] 
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pirical research is needed to test the effectiveness of simulations in 
that more complex context. 
• medical malpractice; 
• product liability; 
• biomedical/biotechnology; 
• complex commercial litigation. 
The common thread shared by these cases include[s] the com-
plexity of the concepts involved and the difficulty in both witnessing 
and understanding the processes or events, for one reason or another. 
Richter, supra note 37, at 85; see also Weinberg, supra note 21, at 5B (citing 
similar kinds of uses for simulations). 
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Col. 1 
Jury 
Panel 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
Mean 
Median 
St. Dev. 
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Appendix 
Table 1 (Base Case, Saw Computer Simulations) 
Study #1 
Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 
Fault Damage Fault 
Assessed Assessed Assessed 
to Torino to Torino to State 
Percent Dollars Percent 
12.0 240,000 8.0 
34.0 899,314 0.0 
0.0 0 66.0 
40.0 1,400,000 20.0 
0.0 0 5.0 
35.0 2,100,000 0.0 
5.0 92,500 35.0 
30.0 802,050 30.0 
5.0 272,200 5.0 
20.0 450,000 50.0 
23.0 1,369,644 23.0 
10.0 336,960 20.0 
30.0 1,357,572 40.0 
15.0 267,974 15.0 
15.0 828,786 35.0 
15.0 375,000 10.0 
0.0 0 0.0 
30.0 1,8311,OOO 40.0 
0.0 0 10.0 
0.0 0 10.0 
5.0 11,005 10.0 
20.0 600,000 5.0 
10.0 600,000 40.0 
30.0 1,290,000 10.0 
50.0 2,993,760 15.0 
55.0 3,300,000 5.0 
0.0 0 0.0 
5.0 360,000 5.0 
10.0 22,010 20.0 
15.0 900,000 35.0 
15.0 155,087 15.0 
0.0 0 10.0 
0.0 0 10.0 
0.0 0 0.0 
10.0 280,354 25.0 
10.0 100,000 25.0 
0.0 0 20.0 
25.0 717,400 0.0 
55.0 3,685,000 35.0 
10.0 735,982 50.0 
0.0 0 40.0 
30.0 1,800,000 40.0 
10.0 9,410 0.0 
40.0 3,600,000 20.0 
50.0 1,737,870 0.0 
17.2 789,331 19,0 
12.0 360,000 15.0 
0.164 1,015,269 0.166 
[Vol. 34 
Col. 5 
Damage 
Assessed 
to State 
Dollars 
160,000 
0 
2,970,000 
700,000 
173,643 
0 
647,500 
802,050 
272,200 
1,125,000 
1,369,644 
673,920 
1,810,096 
267,974 
1,933,834 
250,000 
0 
2,440,000 
122,010 
174,485 
22,010 
150,000 
2,400,000 
430,000 
898,128 
300,000 
0 
360,000 
44,020 
2,100,000 
155,087 
452,524 
344,637 
0 
700,885 
250,000 
689,274 
0 
2,345,000 
3,679,908 
2,400,000 
2,400,000 
0 
1,800,000 
0 
840,307 
360,000 
977,664 
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Col. 6 
Fault 
Assessed to 
Torino+State 
Percent 
20.0 
34.0 
66.0 
60.0 
5.0 
35.0 
40.0 
60.0 
10.0 
70.0 
46.0 
30.0 
70.0 
30.0 
50.0 
25.0 
0.0 
70.0 
10.0 
10.0 
15.0 
25.0 
50.0 
40.0 
65.0 
60.0 
0.0 
10.0 
30.0 
50.0 
30.0 
10.0 
10.0 
0.0 
35.0 
35.0 
20.0 
25.0 
0.9 
60.0 
40.0 
70.0 
10.0 
60.0 
50.0 
36.2 
35.0 
0.234 
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Col. 7 
Damage 
Table 1 (Continued) 
Study #1 
Col. 8 
Fault 
Col. 9 
Damage 
Assessed to Assessed to Assessed to 
Torino +State Dawn Dawn 
Dollars Percent Dollars 
400,000 80.0 1,600,000 
899,314 66.0 1,745,726 
2,970,000 34.0 1,530,000 
2,100,000 40.0 1,400,000 
173,643 95.0 3,299,217 
2,100,000 65.0 3,900,000 
740,000 60.0 1,110,000 
1,604,100 40.0 1,069,400 
544,400 90.0 4,899,600 
1,575,000 30.0 675,000 
2,739,287 54.0 3,215,685 
1,010,880 70.0 2,358,720 
3,167,668 30.0 1,357,572 
535,948 70.0 1,250,544 
2,762,620 50.0 2,762,620 
625,000 75.0 1,875,000 
0 100.0 0 
4,270,000 30.0 1,830,000 
122,010 90.0 1,098,090 
174,485 90.0 1,570,365 
33,015 85.0 187,085 
750,000 75.0 2,250,000 
3,000,000 50.0 3,000,000 
1,720,000 60.0 2,580,000 
3,891,888 35.0 2,095,632 
3,600,000 40.0 2,400,000 
° 
100.0 0 
720,000 90.0 6,480,000 
66,030 70.0 154,070 
3,000,000 50.0 3,000,000 
310,174 70.0 723,738 
452,524 90.0 4,072,716 
344,637 90.0 3,101,733 
° 
100.0 
° 981,239 65.0 1,822,302 
350,000 65.0 650,000 
689,274 80.0 2,757,096 
717,400 75.0 2,152,200 
6,030,000 10.0 670000 
4,415,889 40.0 2,943,926 
2,400,000 60.0 3,600,000 
4,200,000 30.0 1,800,000 
9,410 90.0 84,690 
5,400,000 40.0 3,600,000 
1,737,870 50.0 1,737,870 
1,629,638 63.8 2,009,124 
899,314 65.0 1,822,302 
1,611,505 0.234 1,386,667 
Col. 10 
Total 
Damages 
Dollars 
2,000,000 
2,645,040 
4,500,000 
3,500,000 
3,472,860 
6,000,000 
1,850,000 
2,673,500 
5,444,000 
2,250,000 
5,954,972 
3,369,600 
4,525,240 
1,786,492 
5,525,240 
2,500,000 
0 
6,100,000 
1,220,100 
1,744,850 
220,100 
3,000,000 
6,000,000 
4,300,000 
5,987,520 
6,000,000 
° 7,200,000 
220,100 
6,000,000 
1,033,911 
4,525,240 
3,446,370 
° 2,803,541 
1,000,000 
3,446,370 
2,869,600 
6,700,000 
7,359,815 
6,000,000 
6,000,000 
94,100 
9,000,000 
3,475,740 
3,638,762 
3,446,370 
2,334,654 
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Table 2 (Variant Case, Did Not See Computer Simulations) 
Study #1 
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 
Jury Fault Damage Fault Damage 
Panel Assessed to Assessed to Assessed to Assessed to Torino Torino State State 
Percent Dollars Percent Dollars 
1 10.0 172,000 0.0 a 
2 10.0 600,000 20.0 1,200,000 
3 20.0 910,000 0.0 0 
4 41.0 1,865,553 20.0 910,026 
5 10.0 572,200 0.0 0 
6 25.0 1,250,000 10.0 500,000 
7 30.0 1,800,000 7.5 450,000 
8 15.0 675,000 30.0 1,350,000 
9 0.0 0 20.0 238,199 
10 40.0 1,018,713 0.0 0 
11 35.0 2,277,398 35.0 2,277,398 
12 12.5 363,467 12.5 363,467 
13 
14 0.0 0 35.0 70,525 
15 45.0 4,050,000 45.0 4,050,000 
16 0.0 0 0.0 0 
17 0.0 0 0.0 0 
18 70.0 4,168,480 30.0 1,786,492 
19 10.0 22,010 10.0 22,010 
20 70.0 5,151,871 10.0 735,982 
21 
22 20.0 1,080,618 10.0 540,309 
23 20.0 556,948 30.0 835,422 
24 0.0 0 0.0 0 
25 0.0 0 0.0 0 
26 0.0 0 0.0 0 
27 20.0 595,297 30.0 892,946 
28 30.0 562,722 20.0 375,148 
29 30.0 1,365,039 50.0 2,275,065 
30 0.0 0 0.0 0 
31 48.3 2,187,048 0.0 0 
32 10.0 410,000 25.0 1,025,000 
33 30.0 570,000 20.0 380,000 
34 30.0 2,000,000 0.0 0 
35 0.0 0 70.0 210,000 
36 35.0 1,504,766 30.0 1,289,800 
37 45.0 2,679,737 10.0 595,497 
38 0.0 0 0.0 0 
Mean 21.2 1,066,913 16.1 621,480 
Median 20.0 583,749 10.0 369,307 
Std. Dev. 19.6 1,295,220 17.2 870,408 
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Col. 6 
Fault 
Assessed to 
Torino+State 
Percent 
10.0 
30.0 
20.0 
61.0 
10.0 
35.0 
37.5 
45.0 
20.0 
40.0 
70.0 
25.0 
35.0 
90.0 
0.0 
0.0 
100.0 
20.0 
80.0 
30.0 
50.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
50.0 
50.0 
80.0 
0.0 
48.3 
35.0 
50.0 
30.0 
70.0 
65.0 
55.0 
0.0 
37.3 
35.0 
28.0 
COMPUTER SIMULATIONS 
Col. 7 
Damage 
Table 2 (Continued) 
Study # 1 
Col.S 
Fault 
Col. 9 
Damage 
Assessed to Assessed to Assessed to 
Torino+State Dawn Dawn 
Dollars Percent Dollars 
172,000 90.0 1,548,000 
1,800,000 70.0 4,200,000 
910,000 80.0 3,640,000 
2,775,579 39.0 1,774,551 
572,200 90.0 5,149,800 
1,750,000 65.0 3,250,000 
2,250,000 62.5 3,750,000 
2,025,000 55.0 2,475,000 
238,199 80.0 952,795 
1,018,713 60.0 1,528,069 
4,554,796 30.0 1,952,056 
726,934 75.0 2,180,801 
70,525 65.0 130,975 
8,100,000 10.0 900,000 
0 100.0 220,000 
0 100.0 0 
5,954,972 0.0 0 
44,020 80.0 176,080 
5,887,852 20.0 1,471,963 
1,620,928 70.0 3,782,164 
1,392,370 50.0 1,392,370 
0 100.0 0 
0 100.0 0 
0 100.0 0 
1,488,243 50.0 1,488,243 
937,870 50.0 937,870 
3,640,104 20.0 910,026 
0 100.0 0 
2,187,048 51.7 2,338,192 
1,435,000 65.0 2,665,000 
950,000 50.0 950,000 
2,000,000 70.0 4,666,666 
210,000 30.0 90,000 
2,794,566 35.0 1,504,766 
3,275,235 45.0 2,679,737 
0 100.0 0 
1,688,393 62.7 1,630,698 
1,205,541 65.0 1,480,103 
1,935,249 28.0 1,490,228 
291 
Col. 10 
Total 
Damages 
Dollars 
1,720,000 
6,000,000 
4,550,000 
4,550,130 
5,722,000 
5,000,000 
6,000,000 
4,500,000 
1,190,994 
2,546,782 
6,506,852 
2,907,735 
201,500 
9,000,000 
220,000 
0 
5,954,972 
220,100 
7,359,815 
5,403,092 
2,784,740 
0 
0 
0 
2,976,486 
1,875,740 
4,550,130 
0 
4,525,240 
4,100,000 
1,900,000 
6,666,666 
300,000 
4,299,332 
5,954,972 
0 
3,319,091 
3,538,243 
2,600,216 
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Col. 1 
Juror 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
Mean 
Median 
Std. Dev. 
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW 
Table 3 (Base Case, Saw Computer Simulations) 
Study #2 
Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 
Fault Fault Fault 
Assessed Assessed Assessed to 
to Torino to State Torlno+State 
Percent Percent Percent 
60 30 90 
80 20 100 
60 5 65 
50 10 60 
75 5 80 
50 10 60 
35 0 35 
10 5 15 
60 15 75 
25 15 40 
45 10 55 
15 15 30 
50 40 90 
40 40 80 
85 5 90 
70 30 100 
0 0 0 
0 20 20 
35 30 65 
20 5 25 
20 60 80 
78 20 98 
70 10 80 
20 0 20 
10 10 20 
80 0 80 
55 10 65 
50 20 70 
50 10 60 
20 30 50 
45 20 65 
85 15 100 
10 30 40 
0 20 20 
90 10 100 
35 10 45 
30 0 30 
10 5 15 
100 0 100 
50 0 50 
10 70 80 
45 10 55 
30 60 90 
43.2 17.0 60.2 
45.0 10.0 35.0 
27.4 16.8 28.8 
[Vol. 34 
Col. 5 
Fault 
Assessed 
to Dawn 
Percent 
10 
0 
35 
40 
20 
40 
65 
85 
25 
60 
45 
70 
10 
20 
10 
0 
100 
80 
35 
75 
20 
2 
20 
80 
80 
20 
35 
30 
40 
50 
35 
0 
60 
80 
0 
55 
70 
85 
0 
50 
20 
45 
10 
39.8 
65.0 
28.8 
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Table 4 (Variant Case, Did Not See Computer Simulations) 
Study #2::: 
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Co1.5 
Fault Fault Fault Fault 
JUror Assessed Assessed Assessed to Assessed 
to Torino to State Torino+State to Dawn 
Percent Percent Percent Percent 
1 20 50 70 30 
2 10 10 20 80 
3 40 50 90 10 
4 35 25 60 40 
5 50 40 90 10 
6 65 25 90 10 
7 20 70 90 10 
8 80 0 80 20 
9 10 70 80 20 
10 a a 0 100 
11 75 25 100 0 
12 40 0 40 60 
13 40 1 41 59 
14 0 10 10 90 
15 59 30 89 11 
16 60 5 65 35 
17 20 30 50 50 
18 5 20 25 75 
19 5 20 25 75 
20 70 10 80 20 
21 30 50 80 20 
22 0 0 0 100 
23 35 15 50 50 
24 35 5 40 60 
25 45 5 50 50 
26 0 0 0 100 
27 30 60 90 10 
28 20 0 20 80 
29 20 0 20 80 
30 30 40 70 30 
31 20 0 20 80 
32 15 0 15 85 
33 40 20 60 40 
34 40 40 80 20 
35 30 40 70 30 
36 20 0 20 80 
37 15 0 15 85 
38 40 20 60 40 
39 40 40 80 20 
40 60 0 60 40 
*This chart is continued on the next page. 
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Col. 1 
Juror 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
Mean 
Median 
Std. Dev. 
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW 
Col. 2 
Fault 
Assessed 
to Torino 
Percent 
10 
20 
75 
40 
30 
40 
70 
90 
40 
40 
80 
75 
75 
30 
50 
40 
32 
85 
75 
80 
40 
39.11 
40 
24.48 
Table 4 (Continued) 
Stndy#2 
Col. 3 Col. 4 
Fault Fault 
Assessed Assessed to 
to State Torlno+State 
Percent Percent 
10 20 
20 40 
25 100 
10 50 
0 30 
0 40 
0 70 
0 90 
50 90 
0 40 
10 90 
5 80 
15 90 
50 80 
40 90 
0 40 
3 35 
15 100 
5 80 
12 92 
10 50 
18.13 57.25 
10 60 
19.75 29.84 
[Vol. 34 
Col. 5 
Fault 
Assessed 
to Dawn 
Percent 
80 
60 
0 
50 
70 
60 
30 
10 
10 
60 
10 
20 
10 
20 
10 
60 
65 
0 
20 
8 
50 
42.75 
40 
29.84 
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